Agroforestry Concessions in the Peruvian Amazon
.svg)
This case innovation has been analysed using the Transformative Intervention Mixes (TIMs) framework. The framework maps the regulatory, economic, social‑behavioural, technological and material interventions at play, clarifying how these elements interact and what this configuration suggests about the innovation’s capacity to support transformative change.
Agroforestry
Agroforestry Concessions in the Peruvian Amazon
Forest governance and tenure formalisation; agroforestry adoption; deforestation reduction and restoration on public forest land
Agroforestry concessions are a legal mechanism under Peru’s Forest and Wildlife Law (Law 29763) intended to formalise informal smallholder land use on public forest land via renewable long-term leases, coupled with requirements to establish/maintain agroforestry systems and avoid further agricultural expansion into forest. The SUCCESS project evaluated and supported implementation through research and policy engagement with national and regional actors, and direct engagement with smallholders in Ucayali and San Martín.
Policy mechanism at national level with devolved implementation by regional governments; project engagement reported with around 200 smallholders across seven communities in Ucayali and San Martín, and early pilots including initial concession contracts in San Martín.
Practical: formalisation intended to incentivise establishment and maintenance of agroforestry systems and conservation practices (e.g., soil and water conservation, reforestation) within concession areas.
Political: implementation of a new legal tenure instrument (40-year renewable enabling title) involving regional governments and SERFOR, including pilots and contract allocation.
Personal: documented generation of new knowledge, attitudes, skills and relationships among key actors to inform decision-making and implementation.
Moderate: potential scaling is linked to institutional capacity for implementation and enforcement, and to addressing documented compliance barriers and incentive gaps for smallholders.
Summary
The case is strongly evidenced for regulatory and knowledge-based tools: agroforestry concessions are grounded in Peru’s Forest and Wildlife Law (Law 29763) and associated technical guidelines, while the SUCCESS project generated evidence on smallholder eligibility, compliance capacities and implementation barriers to inform policy and pilots. Voluntary-advisory-educational mechanisms are also prominent through workshops, surveys, interviews and participatory geographic information system activities with smallholders and other stakeholders. Market-based mechanisms are discussed mainly as an intended benefit (access to formal markets, credit and incentives) but are described as under-developed in practice, with informants noting slow action to develop incentives. Choice architecture, emotional appeal and technology (beyond participatory mapping methods) are weakly evidenced or absent in the named sources. Overall, the configuration indicates an institutional–epistemic pathway in which tenure reform is coupled with research-for-policy engagement to make implementation more context-appropriate; a key implementation insight is that scaling depends on addressing documented compliance constraints and incentive gaps for smallholders.
Implications for Intervention Mix Design (analytical reflection): The current evidence base suggests that the concession mechanism’s regulatory spine is not sufficient on its own to deliver widespread practice change if incentives and support services remain limited. To enhance transformative scope, additional alignment would be required with market-based instruments (e.g., incentives/credit access) and structured advisory provision that addresses heterogeneous compliance capacities, while avoiding claims that such tools are already in place. Strengthening transparency and feedback loops between pilots, guideline revision processes and regional implementation would also be required to reduce policy–practice misalignment.
| Tool Category | Examples | How it ENABLES (mechanisms) | How it HINDERS (barriers) | Opportunities to strengthen | Risks / caveats | Additional suggestions and resources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regulatory | Peru Forest and Wildlife Law (Law 29763) provision for agroforestry concessions; enabling title via 40-year renewable lease; regional governments issuing concession contracts and resolutions for special treatment zones. | Creates legally recognised tenure rights and responsibilities for smallholders on public forest land, aiming to formalise land use and condition access on maintaining forest cover and establishing agroforestry systems. | Implementation is described as slow and uneven, with weaknesses in regional regulation and unmodified guidelines limiting broader compliance and uptake. | Reasonably implied: use pilots and evaluation findings to inform technical guideline revision processes and clarify actor responsibilities across forestry–agriculture interfaces. | Regulatory complexity and unclear responsibilities can delay contracts and reduce credibility; if enforcement is weak, formalisation may not translate into practice change. | Catchment- or landscape-scale advisory delivery models that coordinate multi-actor implementation support (e.g., integrated local delivery approaches); differentiated regulatory requirements for smallholders/ disadvantaged groups, maintaining biodiversity safeguards; incentive mechanisms linked to concession compliance. |
| Financial / Market-Based | Formalisation is intended to facilitate access to formal markets for products and services (e.g., timber, non-timber, ecosystem services, carbon sequestration); informants note incentives to support compliance were not capitalised. | Where present, improved market access and incentives could lower compliance barriers and make agroforestry adoption economically feasible for concession holders. | Explicitly reported slow development of incentives and limited capitalisation reduces smallholders’ ability to comply and limits uptake. | Reasonably implied: design and implement incentives/credit mechanisms linked to compliance constraints identified in pilots and research findings. | If incentives are poorly targeted, benefits may concentrate among better-resourced actors, exacerbating inequities in who can comply. | Targeted support for sustainable value chains and verification systems connected to concession compliance (not documented as implemented). Compliance-linked Agroforestry Incentive Payments – targeted bonuses for concession holders who verifiably meet agroforestry and forest-conservation requirements, with basic safeguards against capture by illicit economies. Smallholder Agroforestry Credit Access Fund – low-interest credit for concession holders to cover upfront agroforestry establishment costs, combined with due-diligence checks to protect borrowers from criminal interference. |
| Information / Education | Workshops, surveys, interviews and participatory PGIS activities with smallholders; dissemination of findings to government and NGO actors to inform decision-making. | Builds understanding of eligibility, requirements and local constraints, and provides decision-relevant evidence to implementing bodies for more context-appropriate implementation. | Information alone does not resolve structural barriers to compliance (e.g., lack of incentives or technical support), risking limited translation into practice. | Explicitly suggested in evaluation discussions: continue building the agroforestry concession knowledge base and identify future research areas. | Over-reliance on evidence generation without follow-through into guideline revision and support measures may reduce stakeholder trust over time. | Structured extension or advisory services that translate guidelines into farm-level practice (referenced as a need, not documented as delivered). |
| Choice Architecture | ||||||
| Social Norms | ||||||
| Emotional Appeal | ||||||
| Technology | Participatory geographic information system (PGIS) methods used to engage communities and inform implementation planning. | Spatially explicit information can support eligibility identification, zoning and implementation planning across heterogeneous landscapes. | Interoperable land-tenure and compliance monitoring systems (not documented in the named sources). | |||
| Infrastructure (Hard/Soft) | ||||||
| Biophysical Resources | ||||||
| Knowledge | Evaluation documents how the project generated knowledge, attitudes, skills and relationships to support agroforestry concession decision-making, implementation and practice; quantification of potential emissions reductions used to strengthen policy agendas. | Evidence on smallholder heterogeneity and compliance capacities supports more realistic policy and implementation design and strengthens arguments for climate and conservation relevance. | Evidence of policy change was limited at the time of evaluation; feedback to draft guidelines was reportedly not incorporated, indicating weak uptake into formal policy instruments. | Use pilots and requests for recommendations to translate findings into technical guideline revisions and implementation support packages. | If findings are selectively used for agenda-setting without addressing implementation barriers, expectations may be raised without corresponding benefits. | Independent monitoring and learning systems that track outcomes across pilots and regions (not documented in the named sources). |
| Other | Multi-actor partnerships (e.g., collaborations with academic and development partners) and policy engagement processes supporting pilot development and institutional learning. | Builds legitimacy and working relationships between NGOs, regional governments and national authorities to support piloting and experiential learning. | Policy development described as slow and politicised, limiting the speed at which learning is translated into revised instruments. | Formalise learning loops from pilots into decision forums across regional and national levels. | Dependency on a limited set of actors can create bottlenecks and continuity risks. | Co-designed platforms for stakeholder deliberation and feedback (not documented in the named sources). |
Note: Blank cells reflect that the documentary evidence available for this case did not contain sufficiently explicit information to address these dimensions. This absence should not be interpreted as implying that such mechanisms were irrelevant or ineffective, but simply that they were not documented within the scope of the source materials.