Őrség, Hungary

Innovation:
Agri-Environment Results-Based Payment Scheme
TIMs Case Analysis

This case innovation has been analysed using the Transformative Intervention Mixes (TIMs) framework. The framework maps the regulatory, economic, social‑behavioural, technological and material interventions at play, clarifying how these elements interact and what this configuration suggests about the innovation’s capacity to support transformative change.

The case analysis draws primarily on evidence synthesised from:

Kelemen et al. (2025) and Berta et al. (2026)

Overview

Innovation

Agri-Environment Results-Based Payment Scheme

Specific Intervention Case

Inclusive biodiversity monitoring emerging from a Hungarian results-based payment scheme (Őrség)

Target Field / Sector

Agri-environment policy; biodiversity conservation on farmland; farmer decision-making and monitoring

Context

Co-design of a results-based agri-environment payment scheme in Őrség, linking payments to biodiversity outcomes and developing monitoring approaches that can be used by non-scientific experts, with involvement of farmers, conservation actors and policymakers.

Scale

Regional design process with national-level policy engagement; intended as a policy instrument but not yet launched as an operational scheme at time of reporting.

Sphere of transformation

Practical: Links payments to biodiversity indicators and develops low-tech, easy-to-use monitoring approaches.

Political: Engages national-level policymakers and highlights policy-window constraints and administrative risk perceptions affecting uptake.

Personal: Builds trust and long-term collaboration between the National Park Directorate and farmers through workshops and interaction.

Potential for Amplification

Moderate: Participants explore relaunch and amplification, including combining low-tech monitoring with digital tools to enable wider scaling.

TIMs Summary

The case evidences strong financial/ market-based mechanisms in the design intent, as payments are explicitly linked to performance on biodiversity indicators, alongside substantial voluntary–advisory–educational and knowledge-oriented processes through workshops, co-design and field learning. Technology is evidenced primarily as a prospective or enabling element in monitoring, with low-tech approaches foregrounded and remote sensing or mobile/ digital tools discussed as options for amplification. Regulatory mechanisms appear mainly as contextual constraints and perceived administrative risk rather than as an implemented binding instrument within the case.

This configuration implies a primarily incentive-and-learning pathway, where co-produced indicators and trusted monitoring are intended to reorient farmer practices towards biodiversity outcomes. Implementation depends on policy alignment and administrative capacity, with uptake constrained by timing and limited follow-through from national institutions.

Implications for Intervention Mix Design

Broadening transformative scope would require stronger alignment with political and regulatory tool categories at higher governance levels to create a viable policy window and administrative arrangements for payment delivery. Alongside, technology and knowledge infrastructures would need coordinated development to support credible, scalable monitoring without increasing perceived compliance risks.

TIMs Matrix

Tool Category Examples How it ENABLES (mechanisms) How it HINDERS (barriers) Opportunities to strengthen Risks / caveats Additional suggestions and resources
Regulatory Rigid action-based agri-environment regulations described as context for change. If verification requirements are burdensome, they may undermine participation and feasibility.
Financial/ Market-Based Payments directly linked to biodiversity performance indicators; calculation of payment values by agricultural and ecological economic expertise Outcome-linked payments may be sensitive to ecological variability and measurement disputes.
Information / Education Stakeholder workshops and expert workshops to develop shared vision, habitats and indicators; field trip learning from existing schemes. If education is not paired with institutional uptake, it may not translate into policy change.
Choice Architecture Results-based payment design linking rewards to biodiversity indicators rather than prescribed management actions; co-developed indicator framework guiding attention towards measurable habitat outcomes. Overemphasis on measurable indicators may encourage attention to rewarded outcomes while neglecting non-measured biodiversity values.
Social Norms Shared future vision identified as legitimising basis for planning across stakeholders with differing interests. Consensus narratives can mask persistent conflicts over implementation burdens or benefits.
Emotional Appeal Trust-building between farmers and the National Park Directorate through workshops and long-term collaboration; shared visioning processes around biodiversity conservation outcomes. Reliance on goodwill and trust may be difficult to sustain if institutional commitments or payment mechanisms do not materialise.
Technology Low-tech, easy-to-use monitoring approaches; exploration of combining monitoring with remote sensing or other digital tools. Overly complex monitoring could reduce participation and increase administrative burden.
Infrastructure (Hard/Soft) Multi-actor co-design process involving national policy lab engagement alongside local actors. Reliance on project-based structures can limit continuity once project support ends.
Biophysical Resources Targeting of specific habitats and biodiversity status indicators in Őrség landscapes. Ecological variability may affect outcome measurement and perceived fairness.
Knowledge Selection of indicators; rendering monetary values and calculating payments; policy learning about trusted self-monitoring. If evidence remains limited, results-based approaches may be perceived as high-risk.
Other

Note: Blank cells reflect that the documentary evidence available for this case did not contain sufficiently explicit information to address these dimensions. This absence should not be interpreted as implying that such mechanisms were irrelevant or ineffective, but simply that they were not documented within the scope of the source materials.

References

Berta, G., Czett, K., Kelemen, E., & Megyesi, B. (2026).  Őrség National Park – Results-Based Agri-Environmental Payment Scheme. In R. Voelker, I. Soliev, G. Berta, L. Binder, K. Czett, K. Dehnen-Schmutz, M. Fischer. A. Franklin, S. Harrigreen, E. Kelemen, V. Kiss, B. Megyesi, K. Mills, J. Nel, I. Salverda, R. van Dam, A. Wortel, A. (2026). Report on Local Scenarios Workshops. (Report No D4.2). Project 101181857 – DAISY (pp. 40-61). Brussels: European Research Executive Agency.
Kelemen, E., Megyesi, B., Czett, K., & Berta, G. (2025). Inclusive biodiversity monitoring: Emerging socio-technological innovation from a Hungarian results-based payment scheme. In A. Franklin & K. Dehnen-Schmutz, K. (Eds). Report of Local Case Studies Experience Workshops (Report No D4.1). Project 101181857 – DAISY (pp. 52-69). Brussels: European Research Executive Agency.